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Abstract. We describe the application of our collaboration-oriented
software engineering approach to the design of trust-aware systems. In
this model-based technique, a specification does not describe a physical
system component but the collaboration between various components
which achieve system functions by cooperation. A system model is com-
posed from these collaboration specifications. By a set of transforma-
tions, executable code can be automatically generated. As a modeling
language, we use UML 2.0 collaborations and activities, for which we
defined a semantics based on temporal logic. Thus, formal refinement
and property proofs can be provided by applying model checkers as well.
We consider our approach to be well-suited for the development of trust-
based systems since the trust relations between different parties can be
nicely modeled by the collaborations. This ability facilitates also a tight
cooperation between trust management and software engineering experts
which are both needed to create scalable trust-aware applications. The
engineering approach is introduced by means of an electronic auction sys-
tem executing different policies which are guided by the mutual trust of
its principals. While the approach can be used for various trust models,
we apply Jøsang’s Subjective Logic in the example.
1 Introduction
Since the turn of the millenium, the management of trust has gained more and
more momentum. While this field is inherently multi-disciplinary and researchers
from psychology, sociology, philosophy, law and economics work on trust issues
for many years, computer science seems to be the driving force behind the cur-
rent advances. An important reason for that is the maturing of the internet-based
consumer commerce [1]. The acceptance of e-commerce services depends directly
on the trust the different parties involved in it can build up in each other. In
the internet, however, commerce partners are often unknown, live in another
country with a different legal system, and are selected on an ad hoc basis guided
by the best offer. Therefore, traditional trust building mechanisms like personal
experience, recommendations by friends, or the general reputation “in town”
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cannot be used in the same way as in traditional commerce. The trust manage-
ment community started to overcome this deficiency by developing trust models
consisting of both representations for trust in computers and related mechanisms
specifying the building of trust. Some of these models describe trust in a more
general way from either a mathematical-philosophical perspective (e.g., [2, 3]) or
from a sociological-cognitive view (e.g., [4, 5]). Other approaches are devoted to
realize trust building mechanisms which take the practical limits of computer
systems and networks into account [6–10].
The invention of computer-readable trust mechanisms facilitates the design
of applications incorporating trust. Most approaches enhance or replace tradi-
tional security mechanisms at points where they are not suitable for modern
ad hoc-networks. In particular, a number of solutions were developed for access
control of both peer-to-peer networks [11–13] and business processes for web ser-
vices [14–16] while other tools approach authorization [17], authentication and
identity management [18] as well as privacy [19]. A second field of application
design is devoted to federate systems combined of separate partners and, in par-
ticular, to determine the kind of mutual protection of the partners. Here, a wide
field starting at security-protecting routing algorithms [20] via the formation of
virtual organizations [21] to the trust-based protection of component-structured
software [22, 23] and the protection of collaborations of pervasive devices [24] is
covered. It does not require prophetic skills to expect that there will be a lot
more trust-encompassing systems to come in various application domains.
As the design of trust-based systems can be quite complex, it has to incorpo-
rate typical software engineering techniques. The application of these techniques
is usually so difficult that experienced software engineers are required. Thus, to
develop a trust-aware system, we need experts both for the trust management
and for software engineering who have to cooperate very closely since the trust
management functions of a system are tightly interwoven with the rest of the
system logic. Ideally, the trust management developer should be able to integrate
trust models into a system design process without necessarily understanding the
full application logic, while the software designer should be capable to make
the general software engineering decisions without comprehending the complete
functionality of the underlying trust management model.
We consider our software engineering approach based on collaboration-orien-
ted formal system models [25] as a solution to this problem. Most modeling tech-
niques combine system specifications from models specifying a separate physical
software component each. In contrast, in our technique a specification building
block describes a partial system functionality which is provided by the joint ef-
fort of several components cooperating with each other. Every component taking
part in a collaboration is represented in the form of a so-called collaboration role.
The behavior models of collaborations specify both the interactions between the
collaboration roles as well as local behavior of collaboration roles needed to pro-
vide the modeled functionality. Collaborations may be composed with each other
to more comprehensive collaborations by means of collaboration uses. Thus, hi-
erarchical system models are possible.
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Fig. 1. Collaboration of the Trusted Auction System
As an example, we depict in Fig. 1 the collaboration uses of the highest hierar-
chical level to model a trusted electronic auction system which will be introduced
in detail in sections 3 and 4. The system specifies an automatic internet-based
auction system which could, for instance, be built upon the web services offered
by eBay. From a trust management perspective, the major problem of such a
system is the sale between the winning buyer and the seller after the auction
since the reluctance of one party to pay resp. to deliver the product may cause
damage to the other side. As a solution, we provide a trust-encompassing appli-
cation based on a reputation system (e.g., the eBay feedback forum). According
to their mutual trust, both parties can decide how to carry out the sale. As a con-
sequence, the example system incorporates four major components: the winning
buyer, the seller, the reputation system and the auction house. Its functionality
is expressed by means of seven collaboration uses depicted in Fig. 1. The col-
laboration use btr models the access to the reputation system by the buyer in
order to retrieve the current trust of the community in the seller. We will see
in Sect. 4 that this retrieval is done before bidding for the product. Likewise,
the collaboration use str describes the retrieval of the buyer’s trust value by the
seller which takes place after the auction. According to the mutual trust, the
buyer and seller perform the sale which is modeled by ts. Indeed, this collabo-
ration is a composition from more basic collaborations specifying four different
modes which depend on the trust of the participants in each other. After fin-
ishing the sale, both parties report their mutual experiences to the reputation
system which is expressed by the collaboration uses bre and sre. The remaining
collaboration uses op and bp describe the offering of goods by the seller and the
bidding of the buyer. As these collaboration uses are not relevant from a trust
management perspective, they are not discussed further.
Fig. 1 is a collaboration in the popular graphical modeling language UML 2.0
(Unified Modeling Language [26, 27]). These diagrams are used to describe the
basic structure of a collaboration (i.e., the collaboration uses forming it and the
relation between the roles of the collaboration uses and those of the comprehen-
sive collaboration). To specify the behavior of the collaborations and the logic
combining collaboration uses is described by UML activities which are intro-
duced in Sect. 3.
As trust relations are inherently collaborative and always comprise at least a
trustor and a trustee, we consider the collaboration-oriented specification style
very helpful to develop trust-based systems. The reduction of systems to sub-
functionalities supports their understanding to a high degree (cf. [25, 28–30]).
As discussed in Sect. 2, we consider this property useful to provide trust man-
agement experts and software developers with a fundament for tightly inter-
woven cooperation. In addition, the model structure enables a higher reuse of
collaborations. In many distributed application domains, the system components
cooperate with each other by means of a relatively small number of recurrent
sub-functionalities which can be specified once and thereafter stored in a library.
System developers can create their specifications in a relatively simple way by se-
lecting collaborations from the library, instantiating them, and composing them
to a system description. In our example, btr, str, bre, and sre are instantiations
of the collaborations Trust Retrieval resp. Report Experience which are suitable
building blocks to create applications using reputation systems.
By means of an algorithm [31], we can automatically transform the collabo-
ration-oriented models into executable state machines from which in a second
step executable code can be generated [32]. Moreover, we currently develop a
transformation to TLA+ [33], the input syntax of the model checker TLC [34]
which facilitates formal proofs of system properties. This will be further discussed
in Sect. 5. Before that, we discuss in Sect. 2 the benefit of our approach for the
generation of trust management-based systems. Thereafter, the specification of
collaborations by UML collaboration diagrams and activities is introduced by
means of the trusted auction example in Sect. 3. The coupling of collaboration
uses to more comprehensive collaborations is outlined in Sect. 4.
2 Trust Management Aspects
In recent years, numerous definitions for trust have been published. A significant
one was introduced by Jøsang [35] who distinguishes between trust in humans
and trust in computers. He calls humans as well as organizations formed by
humans with a free will passionate entities. In contrast, computers and other
entities without a free will are named rational entities. Trust in a passionate
entity is defined as “the belief that it will behave without malicious intent” while
trust in a rational entity is “the belief that it will resist attacks from malicious
agents” [35]. Both definitions have in common that a trustor can only be a
passionate entity since trust needs a free will. Nevertheless, in specific application
domains both the building of trust and its deployment selecting different policies
to deal with the trustee is so rational that it can be handed over to a computer.
A good example is the decision making process of banks whether to provide
loans or not. A bank’s behavior is basically guided by its trust in a debtor that
he will be able to pay back a loan. To build this trust, typical mechanisms as
the debtor’s behavior in previous cases (i.e., the debtor’s reputation) are taken
into account and the decision is made according to fixed policies. These policies
can be implemented on a computer as already applied in some banks.
For the representation of trust one can apply trust values. For instance,
Jøsang introduces so-called opinion triangles [2, 36]. These are effectively triples
of probability values, the sum of which is always 1. Two of these values describe
the belief resp. disbelief in the trustee while the third one states the uncertainty
based on missing knowledge on the trustee. The building of trust is, in conse-
quence, described by traces of changing trust values. In between, a lot of trust
models were developed which are suited for computers (cf. [2, 5–10]). The uti-
lization of trust in dealing with a trustee can also be realized on a computer by
defining trust-related policies. The actual policy can then be selected based on
the current trust value.
Our collaboration-oriented software development approach is well-suited to
model the mechanisms used to describe the building of trust. A collaboration is
appropriate to describe the various functions of a trust model since every func-
tion affects more than one partner. Moreover, the collaborations can be used
as building blocks for trust-encompassing applications. For instance, the col-
laborations Trust Retrieval and Report Experience used in the trusted auction
model (see Fig. 1) describe the two aspects typically used in dealing with a
reputation system, i.e., the decision about how to deal with the trustee depend-
ing on its current trust value as well as improving the trustee’s assessment by
sending the reputation system a positive or negative experience report. Similar
collaborations can be defined to model other trust gaining mechanisms such as
considering one’s own experience or the recommendation by third parties. In
addition, to support the design of more complex trust building mechanisms, one
can add building blocks enabling the combination of different trust values.
The method is also useful to simplify the cooperation between the trust man-
agement experts and the software engineers. A trust expert can specify the trust
building functions of the system on its own by utilizing collaborations from a
library. The outcome will be a set of collaboration uses that the software engi-
neers can integrate into the overall system model without fully understanding
their internal behavior. The engineers only need to recognize that different trust-
based policies are possible but not the steps to decide which actual policy should
be used.
Somehow more difficult is the support of the cooperation between the two
expert groups in modeling the enforcement of the different trust policies. Here,
aspects of the general application functionality and special trust-related proper-
ties have to be combined. This can be achieved by a twofold proceeding. First,
characteristic trust-based functions may be used to enforce policies. These func-
tions can also be modeled by collaborations and used in several system models.
For instance, a sale between two parties with a low degree of trust in each other
can be performed by including a trusted third party which mediates the sale by
guaranteeing that a buyer cannot receive the product before sending the money,
while the seller must send the product before receiving the payment. It is easy
to model this as a collaboration which can be used by the software engineer
without understanding the exact functionality (see also Sect. 4).
Second, the trust expert can inform the software engineer about trust-related
functionalities the application has to follow. For instance, a requirement of the
trusted sale should be that the buyer only issues the money transfer to the seller
without having evidence of receiving the product in time if her trust in the seller
is high. The software engineer considers these properties in the system develop-
ment. Afterwards, the trust expert can check that the system complies with the
properties by, for instance, proving them with the model checker TLC [34]. In
the following, we will clarify how trust-based systems like the trusted auction
example can be developed using the collaboration-oriented specification style.
3 Activity-Based Collaboration Models
As depicted in Fig. 1, we use UML collaborations to specify the overall structure
of system models composed from collaboration uses. In particular, a collabora-
tion describes the different components forming a system and the assignment
of the roles of the collaboration uses to the components. To model the behav-
ior of a collaboration, UML offers various diagram types like state machines,
sequence diagrams, and activities [27]. We decided to use activities mainly for
two reasons: First, activities are based on Petri Nets and specify behavior as
flows of tokens passing nodes and edges of a graph. This proved to represent
flows of behavior quite naturally and is therefore easy to understand (cf. [25]).
Second, activities are self-contained. Sequence diagrams, for instance, typically
describe in one diagram only a set of system scenarios rather than the complete
behavior. In contrast, activities facilitate the specification of the full behavior of
a collaboration within one diagram.
A typical example for an activity is Trust Retrieval which models the behavior
of the collaborations btr and str in the trusted auction example1 (see Fig. 1).
It is listed on the left side of Fig. 2 and describes the access of a caller to
a reputation system in order to retrieve a trustee’s reputation. Moreover, it
models the decision about a certain level of trust which may lead to different
trust policies. Since the collaboration comprises two different roles, the client
of the reputation system and the reputation system itself, we use two activity
partitions in the diagram which are named by the role identifiers. The interface
of the collaboration to its environment is located at the activity partition of the
client and consists of three output pins each describing a certain level of trust2.
The behavior of the activity is described by a token flow which is started
at the input node in the partition of the client. It passes a token from the
client via the partition border to the reputation system. The token contains an
identifier of the trustee which is computed in the call operation action retrieve
1 We use Jøsang’s approach [2, 37] to specify trust and trust building in the example
but could adopt the specifications easily to other trust models.
2 As these output pins are mutual exclusive, they belong to different parameter sets
shown by the additional box around them.
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Fig. 2. Activities Trust Retrieval and Report Experience
trust value. This call operation action contains the logic to access the number
of good and bad experiences with the trustee and to generate the current trust
value. The trust value is thereafter forwarded back to the caller and evaluated
in the call operation action evaluate trust value (i.e., the trust value is copied
to the auxiliary collaboration variable tv). Thereafter, the token proceeds to a
decision node () from which it branches to one of three edges. The branching is
guided by the conditions of the decision node, which depend on two thresholds.
Finally, the token is forwarded to the activity environment via one of the output
pins high trust, low trust, or no trust. By passing one of the output pins, the
overall activity is terminated. A trust management expert can instantiate Trust
Retrieval simply by defining suitable thresholds.
Activity Report Experience (on the right side of Fig. 2) models the report of
positive or negative experiences with a trustee to the reputation system adjusting
the trustee’s reputation. It is started with a token passing one of the input pins
positive report or negative report. The tokens are forwarded to the reputation
system which adapts the trustee’s data base entry in the call operation actions.
The edges leaving the two call operation actions lead to a merge node () that
merges its incoming flows by forwarding all incoming tokens to the only outgoing
edge. In this way, after registering either a positive or negative report, the token is
passed back to the client’s output pin confirm report describing the confirmation
of the experience report.
The activity Mediated Sale introduced in Fig. 3 expresses a functionality with
several parallel flows. As discussed before, a mediator acts here as a trusted third
party which assures a fair sale by collecting the payment and the product which
are delivered to their recipients not before both are received by the mediator. The
activity consists of three partitions for the buyer, the seller and the mediator. It
is started by two separate tokens arriving from the buyer through the input pin
send payment and from the seller via send product. The token from the buyer
heads to the fork node f1. In a fork node every incoming token is reproduced and
one copy is sent via every outgoing edge. One of the tokens leaving f1 reaches
the send action ReqPayM. We use send actions to model the transfer of signals to
external applications which are not an inherent part of the modeled application.
For instance, the accounting unit of the buyer is an example of an external
system which is notified by ReqPayM to issue the payment to the mediator. The
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Fig. 3. Activity Mediated Sale
other token leaving f1 is forwarded to the mediator which is notified thereby
about the start of the payment. Likewise, the seller calls its delivery unit to send
the product to the mediator which is expressed by the send action RegDelM and
notifies the mediator as well. When the payment arrives at the mediator, it is
notified by its accounting unit using the receive action CnfPayM while CnfDelS
reports the reception of the product. Similar to send actions, we use receive
actions to model incoming signals from the environment. All tokens coming from
the two receive actions and from the buyer resp. seller lead to the join node3
j1. A flow may only leave a join if tokens have arrived on all of its incoming
edges. During the execution of the join, all but one token are removed and the
remaining token leaves it via its outgoing edge. The token leaving j1 continues to
the fork f3 from which both deliveries to the final recipients and the notifications
are issued. Thus, by the combination of j1 and f3 we guarantee that deliveries
are only carried out if both the payment and the product have arrived at the
mediator.
The notification for the buyer heads to the join node j2 and can only be
forwarded if the buyer’s delivery unit reports the product’s reception which
is specified by the receive action CnfDelM . The token passing j2 leaves the
activity via the output pin delivery confirmed. Likewise, the seller sends a con-
firmation of the payment via payment confirmed after receiving the money. As
the two activities introduced above, Mediated Sale can be provided by the trust
management expert. The only necessary cooperation with the software engineer
is to agree about the formats of the transmissions with the various accounting
and delivery units.
4 Coupling Activities
Activities are especially powerful for the composition of behaviors from existing
ones. This is done by means of call behavior actions that refer to other activi-
ties. The events of the activities may be coupled using all kinds of control nodes
and edges, so that arbitrary dependencies between the sub-activities may be
3 UML uses identical symbols for join and fork nodes. They can be distinguished by
the number of incoming and outgoing edges. Fork nodes have exactly one incoming
edge while join nodes have exactly one outgoing edge.
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described. As activities are used in our approach to describe the behavior of col-
laborations, this technique is applied to compose the collaborations behaviorally
(while the UML collaboration in Fig. 1 shows the structural aspect of this com-
position.) An example of a composed activity is Trusted Sale in Fig. 4 which is
composed from the call behavior actions ms and pc referring to the behavior of
subordinate activities (resp. collaborations).
Trusted Sale describes the functionality of selling a product between a buyer
and a seller after finishing an auction. The two parties in the sale may either
have a high or a low degree of trust in the other one, which is modeled by the
two input pins in both the buyer and the seller partition. If the buyer has a
high degree of trust in the seller, she is willing to send the payment immediately
without waiting for the partner. That is described by the send action ReqPayS
to which a token is forwarded directly after entering the activity via buy trusted.
By this send action, the accounting unit of the buyer is notified to start the
payment to the seller. Likewise, the seller is ready to send the product to the
buyer immediately if he has a high level of trust which is expressed by the flow
to the send action ReqDelB.
Since both parties may either have high or low trust in each other, four
different trust relations between the two parties are possible and for each one a
separate sale policy is defined. Nevertheless, to decide about a sale policy, both
parties have to know the partner’s trust in themselves. As a mutual distributed
combination of policies is a quite common function in many networked systems,
we have a collaboration and a corresponding activity 2×2 Policy Combination
available from our general pattern library which can be applied here in the
form of the call behavior action pc. This activity has two input pins and four
output pins on each side. The two parties define the selected input policy by
transferring a token via the corresponding input pin which causes the delivery of
tokens through those output pins describing the combination of the two policies
(e.g., if the buyer sends a token via input pin bt (for buy trusted) and the seller
via sn (for sell non-trusted), the tokens will eventually arrive at the output pins
bt,sn). The input nodes of Trusted Sale are connected with the corresponding
ones of pc and its output pins can be used as the starting points to model the
four sale policies (bt,st; bt,sn; bn,st; bn,sn):
– If both partners have a high degree of mutual trust (bt,st), they simply send
the payment resp. the product without waiting for the other. Each partner
completes the sale after the delivery has arrived. As the payment has already
been started, the buyer has to wait for a token arriving via output pin bt,st
in join j1 for the delivery of the product. The reception of the product is
described by the accept signal action ConfDelS forwarding a token to j1 as
well4. Thus, j1 can be triggered and a token leaves the activity Trusted Sale
via the output pin delivery confirmed which specifies the completion of the
sale on the buyer’s side. The behavior in the partition of the seller is similar.
– If the buyer has only a low trust in the seller but the seller a high one in the
buyer (bn,st), we use a policy in which the seller transfers the product first
and the buyer initiates the payment not before receiving the product. Thus,
the buyer does not send the payment initially, but waits for the delivery of
the product which is expressed by the token in join j2. After the delivery
is notified as modeled by a token heading from ConfDelS to j2, the buyer
initiates the payment, which is described by the send action ReqPayS, and
finishes the sale. The handling of this policy on the seller’s side is identical
to the first one since it behaves similarly in both policies.
– If the buyer has a high degree of trust in the seller which, however, trusts the
buyer only lowly (bt,sn), we use the reciprocal policy to that listed above.
Here, the seller does not send the product before receiving the payment. As
the effective behavior for the buyer is the same as for the policy (bt,st), the
flow from bt,sn is simply merged into the behavior for bt,st.
– If both partners have a low degree of trust in each other (bn,sn), they decide
to rely on a mediator. This can be modeled by applying the activity Mediated
Sale introduced in Sect. 3. The pins bn,sn are simply connected with the
input pins of Mediated Sale and its output pins with the output pins of
Trusted Sale.
When one of the partners cheats by not sending anything, the activity is not
finished correctly but stops somewhere. We will see below that this case leads
to a negative rating of the partner.
The activity Trusted Sale exemplifies the interplay between both expert
groups. The trust management expert provides the software engineer with the
activity Mediated Sale and describes the four sale policies. Based on this in-
formation, the software engineer accomplishes the overall model of the trusted
sale which can be added to the library of building blocks for trusted systems
facilitating a later usage in other applications.
4 The token leaving ConfDelS is stored in a so-called waiting node ( , cf. [31]) which
forwards it to join j1 or j2 depending on which join can be executed first.
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Fig. 5. Activity Trusted Auction
The last activity introduced here is Trusted Auction depicted in Fig. 5 which
describes the behavior of the overall system. The collaboration uses it is com-
posed of (see Fig. 1) are represented by the call behavior actions btr, str, bre, sre,
and ts. While an electronic auction encompasses an arbitrary number of buyers
and sellers, we laid out the activity in a way that only the relation between
exactly one buyer and one seller is modeled by the activity. In consequence, the
whole application is described by multiple instances of Trusted Auction. For the
sake of brevity, we omitted the part in which the seller registers the product
since that is not relevant for trust management. Thus, the activity is started
by the buyer, who becomes active if she finds an interesting product. This is
expressed by the initial node i1 from which, at first, the trust level of the seller
is retrieved by accessing btr. If the reputation of the seller is so bad that there is
almost no trust, the buyer decides not to bid and the activity is terminated by a
final node ( ). If the buyer trusts the seller to at least some degree, she makes
a bid5 which is modeled by the send action MakeBid and waits in the receive
node WinBid for the end of the bidding. If the bid is not sufficient, a token is
received via the accept signal action LoseBid and the activity is terminated since
no further action is necessary. If the bid won, a token leaves WinBid and the
trusted sale is started by forwarding a token to ts. Moreover, the instance bto of
activity Timeliness Observer is started. It specifies a timeout process to detect
late deliveries of the product which will be discussed below.
5 For brevity, we assume that a buyer makes only one bid in an auction.
On the seller’s side, a flow is started after the auction is finished which is
expressed by EndBid. Thereafter, the reputation of the buyer is retrieved in str
and the trusted sale is started as well. Due to the nature of an electronic auction
system, the seller has to start the sale process even if he does not trust the
buyer at all. Furthermore, sto is initiated starting a timer as well. In the case
of a timeout, a token leaves the output pin timeout immediately, meaning that
the payment did not arrive in due time, and via sre a negative report on the
buyer is sent to the reputation system. The confirmation is forwarded to the join
node j1 used to synchronize the activity termination in the seller partition. If
the payment is confirmed, a token proceeds from ts to sto. If this confirmation
arrives at sto after the timeout, a token is issued at the output pin late which is
forwarded to j1. If the negative report was already confirmed, j1 can fire which
notifies the buyer’s side that the seller can accept to terminate the activity. If the
payment confirmation arrives in time, a token leaves the output pin inTime of
sto, issuing a positive report about the buyer. In addition, a token is forwarded
to j1 such that the buyer can be notified about the readiness for termination
after the experience report was confirmed.
The behavior after finishing the sale on the buyer’s side is similar except
for the decision d1. We assume that the delivery unit of the buyer attaches
information to the token sent to the activity Trusted Sale describing if the quality
of the product is sufficient. In that case, a positive report is triggered while a
bad condition of the product leads to a negative report. The join j2 can only be
executed if the delivery of the product was confirmed, the report about the seller
was attested and the seller reported that it is ready to terminate. The execution
of j2 causes the termination of the activity.
As in the activity Trusted Sale, this activity can be developed combining the
competence of the two expert groups. The trust management expert delivers
the activities describing the access to the reputation system as well as some
policies defining, for instance, which reports have to be issued to the reputation
system under which circumstances. This provides the software engineer with the
sufficient knowledge to develop the behavioral model specified by the activity.
5 Implementation and Verification
The fact that activities render a complete system behavior facilitates automatic
generation of code from the collaboration-oriented model which is performed in
a series of steps: At first, we apply the algorithm introduced in [31] which trans-
forms the activities into a set of UML state machines each describing a system
component. As we defined both the semantics of the activities and the state
machines based on the compositional Temporal Logic of Actions (cTLA) [38],
the correctness of the transformation could be verified by a cTLA refinement
proof sketch (cf. [31]). For our example, the algorithm in its current version cre-
ates separate state machines modeling the behavior of the buyer, the seller, the
reputation system and the auction house acting as mediator. Due to the varying
complexity of the four components, the state machines have a quite different
size. Since the behavior of the reputation system is stateless, its state machine
consists only of one control state and three transitions modeling the retrieval of
trust values as well as the addition of positive and negative experience report. In
contrast, the state machine of the mediator consists of 15 control states, while
that of the buyer models the most complex functionality using 64 control states.
The state machines have a special “executable” form in which, except for
the initialization, all transitions are triggered by incoming signals from the en-
vironment or from local timers. Since, in addition, the enabling condition of a
transition depends only on the control state of the state machine but not on its
auxiliary variables, very efficient executable code can be generated. This kind
of code generator has been built for nearly 30 years now (see, for instance, [39,
40]). To implement our example, we used a generator creating Java code which
is executed on the middleware platform JavaFrame [41]. During testing the ap-
plication, we could not detect any significant overhead. The application of the
code generators, the related middleware platforms, and a cTLA-based correct-
ness proof are described in [32].
The trust expert can check if the produced collaboration-oriented model ful-
fills the trust-related properties passed to the software engineer by applying
an animation tool. Moreover, due to defining the semantics of the activities by
cTLA, formal refinement and invariant proofs are also facilitated. For instance,
the property that the buyer may only start a payment to the seller immediately
if she has high trust in him can be expressed by an invariant. This excludes a
state in which (1) the trust level is low, (2) the payment was already sent to the
seller and (3) the product is not yet delivered. By a cTLA proof, one can verify
that the cTLA formula specifying the activity Trusted Sale always fulfills the
invariant. In the context of trusted systems, this kind of proof was introduced
in [42]. We currently develop a tool transforming activities directly into the in-
put syntax TLA+ [33] of the model checker TLC [34] carrying out the proofs
automatically. Of course, model checkers are subject to the state space explo-
sion problem. Thus, the number of states to be inspected in a scalable system
can be too large to be handled by the checker. cTLA, however, supports a cou-
pling style reflecting the activity combinations in a quite natural way. For each
activity, a separate cTLA model is created and, in a proof, only those models
realizing the verified property need to be considered. For instance, to prove the
invariant listed above, only the states of the cTLA model representing the ac-
tivity Trusted Sale must be checked. This quality of cTLA makes our approach
not only well-suited for the design and implementation of realistic trust-based
systems but also enables formal property proofs in a relatively user-friendly way.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we introduced our collaboration-oriented software development ap-
proach which facilitates system modeling by specifying the various cooperations
between the system components separately. We consider the approach well-suited
for the design of trust-aware systems since trust relations between principals can
be directly modeled as collaborations. This property enables the tight cooper-
ation of trust management experts and software engineers without affording a
too close insight in the competence of the other expert group. The collaboration-
oriented development approach is supported by the Research Council of Norway
(RCN) that approved the research and development project ISIS (Infrastructure
for Integrated Services). ISIS is mainly devoted to the creation of a tool set
supporting the suitable design of collaboration-oriented systems. Moreover, we
want to combine the methodologies of collaboration-oriented software design and
security protocol composition. As a result of this project, we expect methods fa-
cilitating the engineering and deployment of secure and trust-aware distributed
systems. The work presented above is considered as a major cornerstone for these
research goals.
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